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CHAPTER 1 
THE CHICAGO CONFERENCE AND ITS LEGACY 
1.1 Introduction 
Bilateral air service agreements are treaties between states that allow international air 
services to take place between the respective countries. These agreements have 
developed an international law regime that governs scheduled air services. However, 
to understand the bilateral air service regime, the questions that must be answered are 
how these agreements gained prominence in international civil aviation, and what the 
services are. For the answers, one is forced to go back to the Chicago Convention. 1 
1.2 The aims of the Chicago Conference 
Towards the end of the Second World War, there was a realisation that, as the aviation 
industry had grown rapidly, a suitable form of regulation of the industry was required. 2 
For this reason the allied powers gathered in Chicago in November of 1944 to attempt 
to work out the direction that international civil aviation was to take. 
The initial aims of the Conference were firstly, to devise a system that would allow for 
all economic matters relating to international civil aviation to be governed on a 
multilateral basis, and secondly, to provide a technical system that all countries could 
follow to standardise the industry. However, as shall be seen, no agreement could be 
achieved on the first aim while the second aim took precedence and became the 
hallmark by which the Chicago Convention would be known. 3 
1 The Convention on International Civil Aviation was signed at Chicago on 7December1944 and 
became known as the Chicago Convention. 
2 During the war, the development of aviation had taken place in a largely military context, and 
the Conference was one of a series of wartime conferences attended by the Allies. See Freer 
(1994) 29. 
3 Lowenfeld (1981) Chapter 2 Section 1.12 at 2-5. 
2 
1.3 The principles adopted at Chicago 
To understand why the goal of multilateral economic regulation did not materialise at 
Chicago, it is imperative to investigate the principles adopted towards international civil 
aviation by the Chicago Convention. The three most important principles to emerge 
from the Conference will be examined here: the right of each state to equality; the rule 
of absolute sovereignty; and the role of the state in international aviation. 
Firstly, the basis of equality is set out in the preamble to the Chicago Convention. The 
concept of equality provides that all nations are to be treated equally and are to be 
given the same opportunities to participate in international civil aviation. 
Secondly, the Chicago Convention followed the Paris Convention in maintaining the 
status quo relating to sovereignty. 4 Article 1 of the Chicago Convention provides that 
contracting states recognise that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty 
over the airspace above its territory. 5 It is this concept of sovereignty that would hold 
the key to the lack of economic cooperation on a multilateral level. By retaining 
sovereignty over airspace, no right of innocent passage is permitted and each country 
maintains a hold over what can be done in its airspace; not only who can fly over the 
country, but also who can land in the country and on what (negotiated) terms. 6 With 
airspace being subject to the sovereign powers of the state, the government of the 
4 The Chicago Convention replaced the 1919 Paris Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial 
Navigation which was concluded after the First World War. Article 1 of the Paris Convention 
accepted the rule of absolute sovereignty over airspace. See Diedericks-Verschoor (1993) 4. 
Diamond notes that the Chicago Convention codified the custom relating to sovereignty, 
however this is erroneous as it had been previously codified in the Paris Convention. 
5 The territory of a state is the land area and adjacent territorial waters under the sovereignty, 
suzerainty, protection or mandate of such a state. See article 2 of the Chicago Convention. 
6 Haanappel (1995) 313. Flowing from the sovereignty rule, is the rule against cabotage. Cabotage 
in short, is when a foreign air carrier performs domestic services in another country. For 
example, Carrier Y belonging to country Y, performs domestic services in country X. See article 
7 of the Chicago Convention which allows states the right to refuse permission for cabotage 
services. In terms of article 7 each contracting state undertakes not to enter into any 
arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other state 
or an airline of any other state, and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other 
state. 
3 
territory involved automatically became entangled in granting the rights to fly above the 
territory. The Chicago Convention resulted in government control which excluded 
foreign commercial aviation operations without local government participation. 
Therefore, governments were set to play a dominant role in the economic and political 
development of international civil aviation. 7 Lehner notes that sovereignty served as a 
basis for state protection and regulation of aviation markets: 
International air transport could have developed in myriad directions based on the principles of 
"exclusive sovereignty" and "equality of opportunity". Yet the negotiating countries created a 
regulatory system pointing in the direction of protectionism. Instead of being framed on the 
principles of free trade and a liberal exchange of commercial traffic rights, the international air 
transport regime is based on a rigid and closed system of regulation so that nations can ensure 
that they "get a share of the market" that sovereignty and equal opportunity arguably guarantee. 8 
Thirdly, although the Chicago Convention does not provide that airlines or aircraft are 
to be owned by the state (article 17 merely requires that aircraft carry the nationality of 
the state in which they are registered), the trends in aviation at the time influenced state 
involvement with the national carriers. De Leon notes that the predominant role of the 
nation-state, equality and sovereignty, allowed states to dominate the development of 
international civil aviation.9 
The stumbling block at the Chicago Conference was how to establish a capacity system 
that would suit all participants in international civil aviation. 10 The above three principles 
acted together to stonewall attempts to create a system of economic regulation of 
capacity. Each state wished to negotiate the economic rights attached to international 
civil aviation for itself and was not prepared to be subject to a multilateral economic 
regime as it did not hold as many pecuniary benefits as individual state negotiations. 
7 Dempsey (1987) 8. 
8 Lehner (1995) 438. 
9 De Leon (1995) 247. 
1 O Diamond (1975) 441 notes that the problems at Chicago were the questions of the control of 
frequency of flights and the capacity of services offered by the international airlines. 
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1.4 The results of the Chicago Convention 
As no progress was made on the multilateral economic front, the Conference needed 
to work out a system that would provide workability and flexibility for international 
aviation. In this process, certain freedoms of the air were identified. As these form the 
heart of the aviation system, it is vital that they be listed. 
1 The privilege to fly across territory without landing. 
2 The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes. 
3 The privilege to land in a foreign territory for traffic purposes. 11 
4 The privilege to take on traffic (passengers, cargo and mail) destined for the 
territory of the state whose nationality the aircraft possesses. 
5 The privilege to take on passengers, cargo and mail destined for the territory of 
any other contracting state.12 
With the identification of these freedoms, the Chicago Convention subsequently gave 
the countries the option to choose one of two systems to govern their aviation 
relationships. These systems were set out in the Transit and Transport Agreements 
attached to the Chicago Convention. If a country chose the Transit (or Two Freedoms) 
Agreement then the privilege of flying across the other signatories' territories without 
landing and the privilege to land for non-traffic purposes were granted on a multilateral 
basis. 13 
Signatories to the Transport (or Five Freedoms) Agreement exchanged all of the five 
privileges mentioned above, which resulted in a multilateral exchange offreedoms and 
would have realised the ideals of the Chicago Convention. However, the main problem 
with the Transport Agreement is that, with the wide freedoms granted by it, the states 
would not be able to negotiate the freedoms on a right by right basis. As a result, a 
11 Traffic purposes mean the disembarkation of passengers, cargo and mail in a foreign territory. 
12 Lehner (1995) 442 notes that the fifth freedom is the most disputed in air services agreements. 
13 Article 1 of the Transit Agreement. 
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state in the Five Freedoms relationship would not be able to gain a pecuniary right to 
the traffic freedoms. The states would not be in a position to fully control the economic 
aspect of civil aviation, as these would fall under the Transport Agreement. A further 
problem with the Five Freedoms Agreement is the issue of fifth freedom rights. As fifth 
freedom rights involve air traffic to third countries, the profitability of long-haul routes 
was influenced. It was the regulation of fifth freedom capacity that proved to be a 
stumbling block. 14 As can be imagined, such wide ranging freedoms were not 
acceptable to the majority of states. With the rejection of the Transport Agreement 
option, no full exchange of economic rights was achieved under the Chicago regime. 
1.5 Scheduled and non-scheduled flights 
The rights negotiated at Chicago led to the separation of air services into international 
scheduled air services and international non-scheduled air services. 15 The Chicago 
Convention governs non-scheduled services in article 5. Here each contracting state 
agrees that all aircraft of other contracting states involved in non-scheduled 
international air services, have the right to undertake flights into or in transit across its 
territory, as well as to make stops for non-traffic purposes without having to obtain prior 
permission and subject to the right of the state flown over to require landing. In essence 
article 5 amounts to a mutual exchange of certain transit and commercial rights for non-
scheduled transport on a multilateral basis. 16 
14 Naveau (1989) 33. 
15 The main reason for this separation is that, at the time, economic viability lay in the proposed 
scheduled flights. At that stage of the development of aviation terminology, services usually 
organised on a large scale, were classified as scheduled. On the other hand, services which took 
place on an infrequent, ad hoc basis were classified as non-scheduled See Guldimann (1979) 
135-149. 
16 Cheng (1962) 2. At the time of the Chicago Convention the non-scheduled air services were 
considered to be of lesser importance as there was little development in the industry. However, 
as Haanappel (1978) and Guldimann (1979) point out, the charter industry has undergone major 
development and regulation of the non-scheduled services is now an issue. Cheng (1962) 27 
also notes that in practice, article 5 is supplemented with further agreements to regulate the non-
scheduled industry. Guldimann (1979) 147 notes that the provisions relating to traffic rights 
present a 'faux probleme' in that there is no real difference in substance, only a difference in 
form and procedure as article 6 requires that scheduled air services need special authorisation 
from the foreign government involved, while article 5 provides that non-scheduled services can 
6 
However, for this work the focus is on scheduled air services as non-scheduled 
services are considered of lesser importance. International scheduled flights are 
regulated in terms of article 6 which states that no international scheduled flight may 
be operated over or into the territory of a contracting state, except with the special 
permission or other authorization of that state, and in accordance with the terms of such 
permission or authorization. 11 
1.6 The technical aspects 
So far, I have concentrated on the failure of the conference to establish multilateral 
regulation for scheduled flights. However, the Chicago Conference had a further aim: 
the establishment of a technical system to govern international aviation on a 
standardised basis. Examples of the technical side of aviation are the communications 
systems and the air navigation aids. 
The technical part of the Chicago Convention places duties on states that go beyond 
the economic and influence all states and aircraft. The system that is used is that of the 
international standards and recommended practices (SARPS) as contained in the 18 
Annexes to the Chicago Convention. The SARPS are considered to be of such 
importance for international civil aviation that the comment has been made that without 
them, international civil transport would be in a state of chaos. 18 The SARPS are 
constantly updated to adapt to the changes in technology. 10 In order to implement these 
17 The ICAO Council adopted a definition of international scheduled flights in 1952 in terms of 
which an international scheduled service is a series of flights that possesses all of the following 
characteristics: it passes through the airspace over the territory of more than one state; it is 
performed by aircraft for the transportation of passengers, mail and cargo for remuneration; each 
flight must be open to use by members of the public; it is operated, so as to serve traffic between 
two points; and it is operated in accordance with a published time table, or it has flights on so 
regular or frequent a basis that they constitute a recognisable systematic series. ICAO Document 
7278/841 as quoted in Guldimann (1979) 137. 
18 Sochor (1989) 409 
19 The International Standards and Recommended Practices are amended and adopted by ICAO 
without a cumbersome ratification process in terms of article 37. Article 37 states that each 
contributing state undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of 
uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organisation in relation to aircraft, 
personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and 
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standards, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was established by the 
Chicago Convention. The ICAO was established pursuant to the Chicago Convention 
and its membership is made up of the member states to the Chicago Convention. 20 
To sum up, one of the main aims of the Chicago Convention was that of economic 
control. At the Chicago Conference states could not agree on economic rights. For this 
reason two multilateral options were made available, the Two Freedoms and the Five 
Freedoms agreements. As the Two Freedoms agreement was not inherently 
economically based, it was a success. The far-reaching economic implications of the 
Five Freedoms Agreement can explain its limited membership and the fact that at 
present it is not used as a regulatory instrument. From this it can be seen that 
multilateral attempts atthe economic regulation of aviation stemming from within the 
Chicago Convention itself, or from subsequent attempts to develop a viable economic 
system under its auspices, were a failure. The need to regulate remained, however, 
and the only avenue open to aviation states was through bilateral negotiation. 
The second aim of the Chicago Convention, that of a standardised technical regime 
was a success and it is in this area that the Convention has made a lasting impression 
on international civil aviation. 
improve air navigation. To achieve this, the ICAO shall adopt and amend from time to time, as 
many international standards and recommended practices and procedures dealing with the 
safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate. 
20 Chapters VII to XII of the Chicago Convention deal with the constitutional issues of the ICAO. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE EMERGENCE OF BILATERAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
The failure of the Chicago Convention to institute a regime to regulate the economic 
sphere of international scheduled air transport gave rise to a vacuum and a system was 
needed to provide regulation. Individual states were left to determine the manner in 
which international scheduled air services would be governed. The exchange of 
economic rights between states was to be regulated by means of bilateral treaties 
between the countries. 21 
Bilateral air service agreements are treaties between two countries, usually negotiated 
by the specific government department involved in civil aviation. 22 Although bilateral air 
service agreements can in theory cover the spectrum from non-scheduled flights to 
scheduled flights, in practice the most common bilateral is that which provides for the 
establishment and the operation of international scheduled air services. 23 In essence, 
bilateral agreements on scheduled air services have to cover two areas: the exchange 
of rights and privileges for scheduled international air services, and the establishment 
of a system of devices to regulate the rights granted.24 
21 See article 6 of the Chicago Convention. A reason for the firm establishment of the bilateral 
system was to allow governments to preserve 'national interests and safeguard the value of their 
airline assets' Congdon (1994) 327. The bilateral system that was established relied on 'the 
principle of trading rights as each state sought to maintain the value of its asset' Congdon (1994) 
327. 
22 Diamond (1975) 430. It may be noted that bilateralism does not necessarily require a formal 
agreement. An operating permission may be obtained under an informal understanding between 
the two governments concerned, or as a 'result of a direct application by the foreign airline to the 
territorial state' Cheng (1962) 231. Cheng notes further that temporary permissions are 
frequently granted pending the conclusion of a formal bilateral agreement. However, it can be 
argued that, in terms of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, these informal 
agreements, either oral or in writing, effectively remain treaties. 
23 iylicz (1992) 135. 
24 Diamond (1975) 426. 
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2.2 The Chicago Standard Form 
The next aspect to be considered is the evolution of the format and content of the 
bilateral agreement into its present form. Brief mention can be made of the role that the 
Chicago Conference played in bilateral development. At the end of the Conference, 
with no multilateral economic regulation in sight, and loathe to leave a vacuum, the 
Conference delegates formulated a model bilateral air service agreement. It was hoped 
that the Chicago Standard Form would in essence act as a framework for bilateral 
agreements, which would in turn ensure a level of uniformity in bilateral air service 
relations. 
The Chicago model clauses covered areas such as airline designation, the qualification 
of airlines, and their authorisation. On a regulatory level, the Standard Form was not 
a resounding success as the provisions did not get down to the nitty gritty of economic 
regulation. There were no provisions to regulate the vital issues of ratemaking and 
capacity on international routes, which were at the time (and remain today) the crux of 
international civil aviation. 25 The Standard Form is in essence a 'structural model' that 
provided a framework for international civil aviation. 26 
As the Standard Form functioned as a guideline treaty for bilateral agreements, 
containing mostly general provisions, the states involved in international aviation would 
still need to formulate or concretise solutions to the problematic areas not covered in 
the Standard Form. This led to the next development in the bilaterals: the watershed 
Bermuda I Agreement. 27 This compromise agreement between the United States and 
the United Kingdom built on the provisions of the Standard Form and added successful 
25 Dempsey (1987) 52. 
26 Gertler (1991) 60 notes that the standard form itself states that it is a means to promote the early 
development of air transportation during a transitional period which was later to be followed by 
more permanent arrangements. 
27 The Bermuda Agreement or Bermuda I is the synonym for the Air Services Agreement between 
the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
which was signed at Bermuda on 11 February 1946, on which date it also became effective. 
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innovations and solutions of its own. 28 
2.3 The Bermuda Agreement (Bermuda I) 
As Bermuda I was based on an actual aviation relationship (that between the UK and 
the USA), it was able to establish workable provisions relating to the problem areas. 
Both countries went to the negotiating table with their own agendas. The devisive 
viewpoints of the UK and the US were essentially the stances adopted at Chicago 
which contributed to the stalemate regarding economic regulation. The bone of 
contention was capacity regulation, especially in relation to the fifth freedom. 29 The 
British point of view at the start of the Bermuda negotiations favoured predetermination 
of capacity with a 50/50 division of capacity, the regulation of rates, no fifth freedom 
grants and the institution of an international body with executive powers over air 
services. The American point of view, on the other hand, favoured no limitation of 
frequencies, no division of capacity, no regulation of rates, complete fifth freedom 
rights, and an international body with advisory power only. 30 
2. 3. 1 The provisions of Bermuda Agreement 
In the final act of the Bermuda Agreement, the US and the UK set out the principles 
forming the backbone of their bilateral air services relationship. It was agreed that the 
countries would encourage a wide distribution of the benefits of air travel. Air travel 
would be operated at the cheapest rates consistent with sound economic principles. 
28 Gertler (1991) 61 comments that ' ... [A]lthough the Bermuda type agreements have become ... the 
preferred instrument of bilateralism in international air transport relations, they are not a 
negation, but rather an addition to, or expansion of, the provisions of the Standard Form, 
supplementing the Standard Form, particularly with respect to economic or commercial 
transportation matters'. Diamond (1975) 442 notes as well, that in the development of bilateral 
agreements, the form adopted by the modem agreements follows that of the Chicago Standard 
Form, while the content or the substance follows that of the Bermuda Agreement. 
29 Cheng (1962) 19. 
30 Diamond (1975) 444. In short, these viewpoints were known as the British 'Order of the Air' and 
the American 'Freedom of the Air' viewpoints. 
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It is from here that a clear division of contents into three groups can be seen: the 
dispute resolution procedures: the administrative provisions; and the regulatory 
measures. 31 
2.3.1.1 Dispute resolution 
The least contentious of these provisions are those dealing with dispute resolution. 
If either party wished to initiate amendments to the agreement, this could be done by 
consultation. However, if consultations failed, either party could give notice of its desire 
to terminate the agreement. 32 In accordance with article 9, any dispute between the 
parties relating to the interpretation or the application of the agreement and annex 
which could not be settled through consultation was to be referred to the Interim 
Council of the Provisional ICAO or its successor. 
2.3.1.2 Administrative provisions 
The second grouping of provisions set out in the agreement are those of an 
administrative nature. The administrative provisions followed the format set out in the 
Standard Form. These provisions can also be termed the so-called 'soft rights' aspects 
of bilateral agreements. Soft rights refer to the fact that these agreements require 
relatively little negotiation and remain standard.33 The soft rights are also influenced by 
the technical provisions of the Chicago Agreement and refer back to it. The 
administrative provisions of Bermuda included the following. 
2.3.1.2.1 Authorisation and designation provisions 
To enable the air services to start, the country granted the service rights, must 
31 Cheng (1981) 34. 
32 Article 13 Bermuda I. 
33 Soft rights, although accepted as unenforceable in general public international law, have a 
specified meaning in the aviation relationship. 
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designate an air carrier or air carriers for the specified routes. The country granting the 
rights must then authorise the foreign air carriers by granting an operating permit. 34 
Just as the rights can be granted and the operating permissions obtained, so the rights 
can be revoked. The general grounds for revocation are firstly, if a party is not satisfied 
that substantial ownership and effective control of the other party's air carrier are 
vested in the nationals of the other contracting party; and, secondly, if a carrier fails to 
comply with the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the other party. 35 
2.3.1.2.2 Charges 
The charges which either party may impose on the carriers of the other party for the 
use of the airports and facilities may not be higher that those that would be paid by its 
national aircraft engaged in similar services. 36 
2.3.1.2.3 Certificates 
Certificates of airworthiness and competency, as well as valid licences issued and in 
force by one contracting party are recognised as valid by the other contracting party for 
the operations of the international services. 37 
2.3.1.2.4 National laws and regulations 
The territorial laws of the contracting parties apply to the designated air carriers 
engaged in international navigation within the other party's territory.38 On the ground, 
34 Article 2(1) Bermuda I. 
35 Article 6 Bermuda I. 
36 Article 3(2) Bermuda I. 
37 Article 4 Bermuda I. 
38 Article 5(1) Bermuda I. 
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the laws relating to the entry into or departure from its territory of passengers, crew and 
cargo of aircraft apply to the passengers, crew and cargo of the designated carriers. 39 
2.3.1.3 Regulatory provisions 
The last grouping of provisions are those of a regulatory nature. It is these that require 
negotiation and agreement and are considered to be the controversial or 'hard right' 
provisions. The provisions are those of capacity, routes and rates. The principles 
behind the regulatory system are that air transport is to be governed by the needs of 
the travelling public and there is to be equal opportunity for the air carriers of the USA 
and UK to operate on any route between their respective territories. 40 
2.3.1.3.1 Capacity 
Regarding the problematic capacity provision, the Bermuda partners decided in general 
that the main objective of the air service is to provide adequate capacity in relation to 
the traffic demands between the respective territories. This adequately covers third and 
fourth freedom traffic. However, the fifth freedom (third country traffic) is governed by 
the principle that capacity is to be related to the traffic requirements between the 
country of origin and the countries of destination; to the requirements of airline 
operation; and to the traffic requirements of the area through which the aircraft passes 
after taking account of the local or regional services. 41 
2.3.1.3.2 Routes 
The routes granted to the parties are set out in the Annex to the Agreement. In order 
39 Article 5(2) Bermuda I. 
40 Wassenbergh (1996) 80 shows the development of the term 'fair and equal'. In early bilateral 
agreements the phrase used was 'a fair and equal opportunity to operate the agreed routes'; later 
the phrase changed to 'a fair and equal opportunity to compete'; and, finally, the phrase may now 
read ' a fair and equal opportunity to effectively participate'. 
41 These principles are found in Cheng (1962) 555-557 and Matte (1981) 231-232. 
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to operate the routes, the designated air carriers are granted the rights of transit, of 
stops for non-traffic purposes and of commercial entry and departure for international 
traffic in passengers, mail and cargo in the other party's territory, as well as the use of 
the international airports and ancillary features. 42 
2.3.1.3.3 Rates 
Section II of the Annex regulates the rates aspect. In terms of Bermuda, the rates 
charged by the air carriers on the routes granted, are subject to the approval of 
contracting parties. 43 Bermuda I allowed for the involvement of the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) in rate setting. 44 Any rate agreements concluded through 
IATA that involve US air carriers are subject to the approval of the United States Civil 
Aviation Board. 45 New rates proposed by the air carriers must be filed with the 
aeronautical authorities of both contracting parties at least 30 days before the 
commencement of the services. 46 
From the above provisions, it can be seen that the Bermuda I compromise consisted 
of the following: the United States accepted the international control of fares (IATA) and 
the parameters within which the services could be operated, while the UK abandoned 
the predetermination of capacity; capacity was to be determined on a needs basis with 
the market influences having the final say. 
42 See Annex I Bermuda I. 
43 Section 11 (a) Annex Bermuda I. 
44 IATA was established as a private inter-airline organisation after the Chicago Conference to 
assist with the coordinating of airline activities, one of which is the determination of international 
tariffs. See Manual (1996) 3.8-1 and Zylicz (1992) 155. 
45 Annex section 11 {b). 
46 Annex section 11 ( c). IA TA is the world-wide non-governmental organisation of scheduled airlines 
established in 1945 to promote safe, regular and economical air transport, to provide means for 
collaboration among air transport enterprises, and to cooperate with ICAO. Manual (1996) 3.8-1. 
Supplementary to these rate provisions are the provisions relating to the IATA rate conference 
and the possible non-application of IA TA rates. If the IA TA rates are non-applicable then section 
11 (d) sets out the manner in which the countries are to agree on rates. 
15 
2.4 Assessment 
The Bermuda Conference is considered to be one of the most important events in 
aviation history as it succeeded in resolving the Chicago deadlock: the capacity issue. 47 
As Bermuda represented a melting pot of viewpoints and offered a workable hard rights 
system, it was soon regarded as the general guideline for the industry to achieve 
economic regulation. With the firm entrenchment of bilateral agreements in the years 
after Bermuda, the dream of a multilateral solution faded and the economic regulation 
of international air transport was confined to bilateralism.48 Bilateral ism also reinforced 
the role of the national government in formulating international civil aviation policy, 49 
which was started at Chicago. Haanappel notes that "in the commercial field, 
governments have not only acted as regulators of a privately owned industry, but they 
have also acted as 'operators', that is, the phenomenon of state-owned airlines."50 
The Bermuda Compromise has affected two principal areas. Firstly, the fact that the 
USA allowed for the regulation of fares by and outside body influenced the strength of 
IATA which has subsequently assumed primary responsibility for the determination of 
fares, subject to the approval of the governments affected by its decision. 51 Secondly, 
capacity would be regulated by the Bermuda principle that allowed 'the governments 
to set out the capacity principles for designated airlines to follow, but allow[s] each 
airline the freedom to determine its own capacity, subject to an ex post facto review by 
the governments through their consultation procedure ... '. 52 
47 Diamond (1975) 443. 
48 Wassenbergh (1995) 85. 
49 Stockfish (1992) 609. 
50 Haanappel (1995) 312. 
51 Dempsey (1987) 53. 
52 Manual (1996) at 4.3-2. 
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2.5 Bermuda II 
I have previously stated that bilateral agreements can be seen from two perspectives: 
firstly from the regulatory perspective which has been considered above; and secondly 
as a policy document. The compromise that was reached at Bermuda I reflected the two 
governments' policies of the day. 53 However, with time the economic background in the 
aviation industry underwent a change, and the policies followed suit. By the 1970s the 
aviation industry was undergoing an upheaval with America, the industry leader, 
moving towards the deregulation of its domestic aviation industry. 54 This deregulation 
in turn influenced international civil aviation. 55 
At the same time there was dissatisfaction from the UK with Bermuda I as its open route 
policies appeared to favour the American carriers. The UK wished to enact a more 
restrictive air policy to protect its interests. The UK denounced Bermuda I in 1976 with 
the result that a new bilateral agreement was negotiated between the US and the UK. 
Bermuda II, reflecting a new approach, came into operation in 1977.56 The end result 
of Bermuda II is that the fifth freedom opportunities and multiple designations were 
restricted, and IATA's role in tariff fixing was downgraded. 57 The hard rights were 
renegotiated. Oddly enough, the restrictive approach adopted by Bermuda II came in 
for harsh criticism from the US industry which was moving towards deregulation. This 
shows that Bermuda II was something of an anomaly in that when it was signed the 
deregulation of the industry was starting yet the bilateral was more restrictive and 
53 See footnote 30 of this work for the Open Air and the Order of the Skies viewpoints. 
54 The 1970's United States Carter Administration was responsible for the start of deregulation in 
that it brought free market economic theory into the international aviation arena. Dempsey 
(1987) 23. See also Stockfish (1992) 614 on the deregulation of domestic aviation in the United 
States. 
55 Haanappel (1995) 313 notes that the deregulation would eventually spread to other parts of the 
world. The instrument of deregulation would be the open skies agreements that the United States 
would promote. 
56 Bermuda II shows a more restrictive approach with the stricter regulation of routes, capacities, 
frequencies and the designation of fifth freedom rights. 
57 Diedericks-Verschoor (1993) 51. 
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regulatory. 58 
Although the regulatory aspects of Bermuda II can be seen as a retrogressive step, on 
the administrative side, development was taking place to keep abreast with advances 
in the industry. Further soft rights were evolving. Safety and security provisions were 
included in the agreement. These provisions reflected the growing concern of the 
industry with these aspects and show the ability of bilateral agreements to adapt to 
changing circumstances and the continued development of standard bilateral 
provisions. 
Bermuda II must be seen as an agreement typifying the relationship between the UK 
and the US. The hard right provisions were not so favourable that other countries felt 
the need to incorporate them into their own bilateral air service agreements. The 
standard form for bilateral agreements remained Bermuda I. 
Bermuda II reflected not only the changes in policy between two countries, but also 
allowed for further development of the standard provisions. Areas vital to the aviation 
relationship were also included. Bermuda II saw the introduction of safety and security 
clauses. It will be seen that future bilateral agreements would retain these provisions 
as standard clauses, just as Bermuda I retained clauses from the standard form, and 
Bermuda II retained clauses from both the Standard Form and Bermuda I. 
To conclude, with Bermuda I, bilateral air service agreements became entrenched in 
the aviation industry. These agreements allowed airlines, the authorised users of the 
rights granted, to operate services between the respective countries. The Bermuda type 
agreement reflects a strong state influence with its involvement of the states in tariff 
authorisation and the role of the airline appears to be that of the authorised user, not 
the negotiator of the rights. 
58 Zylicz (1992) 142. 
CHAPTER3 
THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL AIR SERVICE 
AGREEMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
After the 1970s deregulation upheaval, a new approach was needed in aviation. Ever 
on the forefront of aviation happenings, the United States promoted the concept of 
open skies. 59 Continual growth and changes in the industry have led to new approaches 
in modern bilateral air service agreements. I shall be highlighting the three aspects that 
most reflect the new attitudes. These are the development of clauses that adapt to the 
needs of the day, the increase in airline involvement partnered with the reduction of 
state involvement, and the new forms of airline cooperation that have stretched the 
concepts of sovereignty and the nationality of airline rules. 
In the discussion of these developments, the 1996 SA-USA Bilateral Air Service 
Agreement will be used as the point of departure. 00 The previous SA-USA relationship 
under the 1947 bilateral agreement came to a dramatic end in 1986 which necessitated 
the negotiation of the present bilateral. South Africa's apartheid policy was the 
underlying cause of the renunciation of the bilateral agreement by the United States. 
The United States' Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 
which resulted in the immediate termination of the Air Service Agreement between the 
two countries. A legal technicality arose as to the validity of the termination as it did not 
comply with the one year notice of termination required in the bilateral agreement. 
South Africa attempted to have the United States Department of Transport's revocation 
59 The modern open skies policy is reflected in the Model Bilateral Air Transport Agreement of 20 
March 1995. See (1996) 35 International Legal Materials 1479. 
60 The 1947 USA-SA agreement regulated international scheduled services until 1986. Treaty 
Series No 17 (194 7) Agreement between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the 
Government of the United States of America relating to air services between their respective 
territories. Date of signature 23May1947 Cape Town. Date of entry into force 23May1947. The 
194 7 agreement followed Bermuda I in essence. Amendments were made to it during its lifespan 
to cater for route changes. 
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of the SAA permit set aside on this ground. However, the court concluded that 
Congress had intended the immediate suspension of rights. 61 
3.2 Changes in policy lead to innovations in bilateral agreements 
Before I continue with the provisions of the 1996 Agreement, South Africa's policy 
towards international aviation should be noted. South African civil aviation started to 
undergo a change in the late 1980s when the government announced that there would 
be deregulation of the industry. The deregulation that took place on the domestic level 
also influenced international services. The international policy changed to offer more 
flexibility in negotiating the hard rights. In principle, multiple designation is supported 
in that states are permitted to designate more than one airline to fly any route. 
However, the designated airlines have to share the allocated capacity of that country 
on the specified route. On the capacity front, airlines now have the power to adjust their 
services to satisfy demand within a framework of upper and lower limits. Route access 
points in South Africa are Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. Reciprocity governs 
the gateways: if a foreign airline is allowed to use more than one gateway, then South 
Africa will seek equivalent rights. With the traffic rights, the third and fourth freedoms 
are negotiable while the fifth freedom 'will only be granted to a foreign airline in 
exceptional cases after the potential consequences have been carefully evaluated and 
then only if reciprocal or comparable rights or benefits have been obtained for a South 
African airline'. 62 The last important policy aspect is that of tariffs: the airlines 
themselves are now permitted to set the tariffs and a double disapproval system exists 
in terms of which the tariffs are to be filed with the aeronautical authorities of both 
parties, but the tariff will only ~Y disallowed if both parties disapprove.63 
61 South African Airways v Dole 817 F 2d 119. 
62 Prins (1992) 12 
63 See Prins (1992) for full exposition on change in policy. It may be questioned here as to what 
IATA's role is in tariff setting. IATA, as an inter-airline organisation, is still involved in the setting 
of tariffs amongst the airlines. However, it would appear that mention is not made of the IATA 
structure in the actual bilateral as it is accepted that as the airlines are IA TA members, and the 
IATA machinery is the preferred way of organising tariffs, then it is unnecessary to mention that 
aspect of inter-airline cooperation in the bilateral agreement. 
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This more liberal, theoretical approach is reflected in practice in the 1996 South 
African-US bilateral agreement. The agreement presents a radical departure from the 
previous bilateral and can be seen both as a reflection of the state of the industry, and 
an indication of future trends. It is perhaps the most liberal and complex agreement that 
South Africa has yet undertaken. 64 The negotiation of the agreement was not without 
its difficulties as the reluctance of South Africa to accept innovative developments such 
as code-sharing led to stalling in the negotiations. 65 
The main aim to come out of the agreement is that the two governments desire to 
promote an international aviation system based on competition among airlines in the 
market place with minimum government interference and regulation. 
3.3 The development of the technical provisions 
3. 3. 1 General 
Against this background, the next step is to investigate certain changes and 
developments in the standard clauses stemming from both the Standard Form and 
Bermuda I. Multiple designation for airlines is approved in article 3 of the 1996 
agreement. However, for the authorisations and permits to be granted, three conditions 
must be met. Substantial ownership and effective control of the airline must be vested 
in the designating party, its nationals or both. The designated airline must be qualified 
to meet the legal conditions applied to the operation of air transport. The above two 
qualifications hark back to Bermuda I. A new qualification is that the designating party 
must maintain and administer the safety and aviation security standards.66 The 
authorisations and permits may be revoked after consultation with the defaulting party 
.I 
64 Opinion of Mr Johan Bierman of the South African Directorate of Civil Aviation expressed in an 
interview conducted with the author on 18 February 1998. 
65 Delport (1995) 23. 
66 Article 3(2) {a) (b) {c) 1996 Agreement. 
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if the above conditions are not met. 67 Aviation safety allows the parties to recognise 
certificates of airworthiness and competence on a mutual basis. The standards that 
must be met must be equal to the minimum standards set by the Chicago Convention. 68 
3.3.2 Aviation Security 
Aviation security, on the other hand, is more directly related to the parties' obligations 
under multilateral conventions dealing with security. The parties reaffirm that their 
obligation to each other to protect the security of civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference forms an integral part of the agreement. 69 The parties, when requested, are 
to provide all necessary assistance to each other to prevent acts of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft and other unlawful acts against the safety of such aircraft, of their passengers 
and crew, and of airports and air navigation facilities and to address any other threat 
to the security of civil air navigation. 7° Furthermore, the parties are required to act in 
conformity with the ICAO aviation security standards and recommended practices as 
set out in the ICAO annexes and are required to ensure that the operators (of both 
aircraft and airports) act in conformity with the aviation security provisions. 71 In order 
to facilitate aviation security, each party agrees to observe the security provisions 
required by the other party for entry into the territory of that other party and to take 
adequate measures to protect aircraft and to inspect passengers, crew, and their carry-
on items, as well as cargo and aircraft stores, prior to and during boarding or loading. 72 
67 Article 4 1996 Agreement. 
68 Article 6 1996 Agreement. 
69 In terms of article 7(1) the parties are to act in conformity with the provisions of the Convention 
on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft , signed at Tokyo on 14 
September, 1963; the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at 
The Hague on 16 December, 1970; and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September, 1971. These 
Conventions have been incorporated into the South African law by means of the Civil Aviation 
Offences Act 1 O of 1972. 
70 Article 7 (2) of the 1996 Agreement. 
71 Article 7(3) of the 1996 Agreement. 
72 Article 7(4) of the 1996 Agreement 
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Haanappel notes that the large role that the states play in safety and security 
intervention is undisputed.73 The responsibility is given to the state to ensure that the 
airlines implement the rules, while the airlines can act in an advisory capacity in relation 
to aviation safety and security. 
3.3.3 Surface transportation of cargo 
A further example of the development in bilateral provisions is the provision relating to 
the surface transportation of cargo that the airlines may employ in connection with 
international air transport. The designated airlines can employ any surface 
transportation for cargo to or from any points in the territories of the (other) parties or 
in third countries. This transport includes transport to and from all airports with customs 
facilities and the right to transport cargo in bond under applicable laws and regulations. 
The airlines can perform their own surface transportation or provide transit 
arrangements with other surface carriers. Single intermodal cargo services can be 
offered at a single price for the air and surface transportation combined, as long as the 
shippers are not misled as to the facts concerning such transportation. 74 An example 
of the flexibility that this section offers is the following: A South African airline carries 
cargo destined for Canada from Johannesburg to New York. Once in New York, the 
South African carrier can contract with a trucking company or a railway company (or 
both) in the United States to transport the cargo to Canada. 
3.4 Development of economic provisions 
The next areas of focus is to show how the bilateral agreements now allow for more 
airline influence in the vital economic provisions - which means a lessening of 
government influence and shows that the aims as set out in the preamble are being 
implemented in practice. 
73 Haanappel (1995) 312. 
7 4 Article 8(7) of 1996 Agreement. 
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3.4. 1 Tariff setting 
As will be recalled from the analysis of the Bermuda I provisions, the governments of 
the day were involved with the pricing or tariff setting provisions by means of the 
'double approval' system. This was also carried through to the 1947 SA-US bilateral 
agreement. However, in terms of the 1996 bilateral agreement, the general approach 
to pricing has changed. The designated airlines determine the prices for air 
transportation. The prices themselves are to be based upon commercial considerations 
in the marketplace. The states of the designated airlines may only intervene in three 
circumstances: a) to prevent unreasonable discriminatory prices or practices; b) to 
protect consumers from prices that are unreasonably high or restrictive due to the 
abuse of a dominant position; and c) to protect airlines from practices that are artificially 
low due to direct or indirect governmental support or subsidy. 75 
3.5 Cooperation between airlines 
The third area of interest is that of the cooperation between the airlines. The annex to 
the agreement, which is valid for 5 year periods, sets out in section 6 the cooperative 
arrangements permitted in terms of the agreement. In terms of section 6, any 
designated airline of one party may enter into cooperative marketing arrangements with 
an airline or airlines of the other party and an airline or airlines of a third party. These 
cooperative arrangements are only permitted if all the airlines involved have the 
appropriate authority and if they meet the requirements normally applied to such 
arrangements. 76 Examples of cooperative provisions given are block-space, code-
sharing or leasing arrangements. Cooperative arrangements with third party airlines are 
also permitted as long as the third party authorises or allows comparable arrangements 
between the airlines of the other party and other airlines on services to, from and via 
the third country. The introduction of code-sharing in South Africa has only been made 
75 Article 12(1) of 1996 Agreement. 
76 It is not set out what exactly these requirements are, which leaves the provisions somewhat 
vague. 
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possible in terms of the more open approach of the aviation authorities. 
3. 5. 1 Code-sharing 
The area of cooperative arrangements has grown in scope and importance. To 
evaluate the role of cooperative arrangements, code-sharing will be discussed not only 
to highlight the problems it presents, but even more, to show how airlines can benefit 
from it. 
Code-sharing initially developed in the United States domestic arena as a marketing 
alliance that allowed cooperation between airlines in terms of which the airlines would 
in effect channel traffic to one another. 77 Code-sharing is the use of the flight designator 
code of one air carrier, which service is usually also identified (and, may be required 
to be identified) as a service of, and being performed by, the second air carrier. The 
effect is that airlines can market flights to destinations under their own code number 
without themselves providing the service. 78 
With code-sharing, an airline agrees to share a code with another airline. The end 
result of code-sharing is that from an operational point of view, each of the airlines in 
the partnership operates the same flights as before the code-share agreement. 
However, from a marketing perspective things change: with a code-share agreement 
each airline is able to offer a wider choice of destinations. 79 From the passenger's 
perspective, code-sharing allows for the sale of air transport involving more than one 
airline on an inter-airline basis as if it were transportation on one airline.80 
77 Humphreys (1994) 196. 
78 The code is the designator code assigned by IA TA to the airline for the use in its airline 
operations. The number is that given to a specific flight. Codes are combined with numbers to 
designate a particular flight. Montag (1994) 2. 
79 Montag (1994) 8. 
80 Interlining 'refers to agreements between airlines which enable a traveller to use a ticket issued 
for a flight with one airline, and allowing one airline to issue tickets for journeys to be made partly 
on another airline.' Montag (1994) 5. 
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3.5.1.1 Forms of code-sharing 
Code-sharing takes on different forms. The most common form of code-sharing in terms 
of bilateral agreements is third and fourth freedom code-sharing where the codes are 
shared between the two countries of the airlines involved. However, it does not end 
there. If one looks at the SA-USA Agreement, provision is made for third country code-
sharing which involves the fifth freedom and allows for the codes to be shared from one 
of the home countries to a third country. 81 In terms of the SA-USA bilateral agreement, 
the US and SA are the home countries while Britain could be the third country. The 
code-share services can involve the third country by having the services land at a third 
country airport, or involve flights on the third country carrier. 82 A problem area that 
arose with third country code-sharing, is whether the third country must give regulatory 
approval. 83 It appears from section 6 of the Annex that approval by the third country is 
required as third party code-sharing is only permitted as long as code-sharing is 
accepted by the third country. As the SA-USA bilateral was negotiated after the 
problems areas arose and were resolved, one questions whether it is safe to assume 
that such approval has become standard or custom. 
3.5.1.2 Problems with code-sharing 
Problem areas have been identified in code-sharing. These can be classed in two 
81 Montag (1994) 3. 
82 De Groot (1994) 63. 
83 The classic example of third country approval being required is that of the USA-Netherlands 
Agreement which allowed code-sharing between the US carrier Northwest and the Dutch carrier 
KLM. KLM and Northwest agreed on a route that would see Northwest flying into Amsterdam and 
then code-sharing with KLM on KLM's route to Germany. Although KLM had the rights to the 
Amsterdam/Munich route, Northwest did not. The German court found that the authority granted 
to Northwest in terms of the USA-Germany bilateral agreement did not allow for the use of 
Northwest flight numbers by KLM for routes between Amsterdam and various German cities. The 
court accepted that code-sharing arrangements amount to the establishment of new routes and 
are not merely a marketing instrument on existing routes. On these grounds, code-sharing 
arrangements need the authorisation by the German authorities even if the code-share partners 
are in possession of the underlying rights to fly the routes. Decision No. 4 L 1236/93 Adm. Court 
Cologne (1 October 1993) unreported as quoted by De Groot (1994) 69. See Montag (1994) 11-
12. 
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categories. The consumer related problems and the competition related problems. The 
consumer aspect can be dealt with briefly. The identified problem is that code-sharing 
can reduce the ability of the consumer to identify the provider of the service he is 
buying, which amounts to consumer deception.84 The solution to this problem is to 
adopt measures obliging travel agents to inform the travelling public about the 
implications of a code-share service. 
The second problem, that of competition law, is more complex as national policies 
could be in conflict: the transport policy and the competition policy. Europe has been 
the focus point of the competition law problems. The reason for this is that in some 
countries, in order to receive regulatory approval from the air transport authorities, the 
airlines had to be competitors. However, when a code-sharing arrangement exists 
between actual or potential competitors, it can restrict competition between the airlines. 
Examples that are given of restricted competition are that the code-sharing agreement 
could induce the parties to restrict the capacity on a route so that the capacity is 
sufficient to cover the needs at the time, rather than compete against each other by 
offering additional capacity. 85 Furthermore, code-sharing agreements could possibly · 
lead to an alignment of fares for the code-share flights. The end result of these 
competition aspects is that competition between the airlines and possibly third parties 
can be negatively affected.86 
3.5.1.3 Advantages of code-sharing 
For all the negative rhetoric, the positive aspects continue to promote code-sharing. 
Code-sharing allows participants to increase their choice of destinations and increase 
84 Montag (1994) 22. 
85 Montag (1994) 19. 
86 However, competition and code-sharing need not be seen negatively. Humphreys (1994) 206 
regards code-sharing as only a small part of cooperative arrangements in general and believes 
that the relevance of code-sharing in relation to competition policy will vary from case to case 
as code-sharing can either reduce competition or strengthen the participants so that they can be 
more effective competitors in the open market. 
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the frequency of flights. Added to this, in a code-share relationship the airlines involved 
do not run the risk of operating on their own. For smaller airlines to link up with larger 
airlines holds a distinct advantage as they can both continue services on the less 
travelled routes and still remain profitable if they are attached to a larger airline. Code-
share agreements also allow airlines a measure of access to the national markets - it 
would appear that it offers a loophole in the ownership and cabotage rules. 87 
However, this is not the case, as the foreign carrier is not granted cabotage rights. 
What happens is that the domestic carrier in a code-share arrangement, can offer a 
national flight under its own designator code and so circumvent the cabotage rules. 
This is a major benefit as it attracts airlines to code-share agreements by providing 
access to markets that both national and international rules may prevent them from 
serving. Code-sharing offers the airlines ' ... an excellent means to extend the reach of 
their networks without spending extreme amounts of capital to acquire aircraft and 
introducing excessive additional capacity into markets that cannot sustain it. '88 
A recent South African example of a problem with code-sharing came before the South 
African International Air Services Council. Transnet Ltd lodged a complaint in terms of 
the International Air Services Act 60 of 1993 regarding the franchise agreement 
between Comair and British Airways. Transnet argued that as a result of the franchise 
agreement, Comair was no longer in active and effective control of the relevant 
international air services as required by section 17(5)(b) and that consequently British 
Airways was being permitted to operate services in breach of section 17(5)(a)(ii) of the 
International Air Services Act. 89 The Council found that Comair was still in active and 
87 As will be recalled, standard bilateral air service agreement provisions provide that substantial 
ownership and effective control of the airline must be vested in the party designating the airline, 
the nationals of the party or both. Cabotage provisions state that nothing in the agreement shall 
be deemed to confer on the airline or airlines of one party the right to take on board, passengers, 
mail, or cargo, carried for compensation and destined for another point in the territory of the 
other party. 
88 De Groot (1994) 65. 
89 Section 17(5)(b) IASA requires that the applicant for a licence is considered fit if the person is 
actively and effectively in control of the international air service. Section 17(5)(b)(ii) requires that 
the applicant be incorporated in the Republic and that the voting rights in respect of the applicant 
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effective control of the air services on the basis that code-sharing can be operated in 
several acceptable forms and that Comair was in a broad sense, utilising the British 
Airways flight designator on a code-share basis. This is not in contravention of the 
International Air Services Act. The Council found no substantiation for the allegations 
that Comair had relinquished active and effective control of its licensed international 
routes in favour of th~ UK-registered British Airways. 00 
3.5.1.4 The development as a tradable right 
Now that code-sharing has been discussed briefly, its importance can be considered 
in the light of the development of bilateral agreements. I have already made mention 
of the soft rights and hard rights (negotiable rights) that are exchanged in bilateral 
agreements and their development. Now the question is whether another tradable hard 
right has developed in the form of code-sharing. 
It is trite that code-sharing is now a negotiable point in terms of bilateral air service 
agreement consultations. 91 One may question why code-sharing needs to be 
considered, in terms of the exchange of rights. Bilateral agreements are inherently 
concerned with the granting of rights and code-sharing can be considered to be a form 
of airline cooperation permitted in terms of the bilateral agreement. General airline 
cooperation has never been a problem (for example, interairline cooperation forms the 
backbone of cooperation), so why is code-sharing so problematic? The answer, in brief, 
is that state attitudes and developments in the industry indicate that code-sharing (and 
possibly airline alliances in general) may have developed into a tradable commodity, 
or an exchangable bilateral hard right. It is for this reason that code-sharing is so 
are held substantially by residents of the Republic. 
90 Fax dated 7 April 1997 (reference CA21/4/2/1) from the Department of Transport to the 
Directorate of Air Transport Regulation. Subject: International Air Service Act 1993 (Act No 60 
of 1993). Press release April 09 1997 CDCAA on the British Airways/Comair Franchise 
Agreement decision by the International Air Services Council. 
91 See Delport note 65 above on the SA-USA negotiations. 
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problematic. 92 
De Groot has identified a progression in the development of code-sharing in the United 
States. 93 Code-sharing started out as a marketing instrument between airlines. It 
progressed to requiring the underlying traffic rights for a code-share arrangement and 
then a specific form of authorisation from the aviation authorities. As the influence of 
code-sharing grew, traffic rights were exchanged for the sole purpose of allowing code-
sharing. Now code-sharing can be viewed as a 'quasi-traffic' right. 94 The development 
of code-sharing from a soft right (a marketing instrument) to a hard right (a traffic right) 
has been fostered by the aviation authorities taking a restrictive approach to code-
sharing by relating it to traffic rights, and not regarding it as a cooperative marketing 
arrangement. 
3.6 Assessment 
Where does code-sharing belong in bilateral negotiations? The conservative approach 
places code-sharing in the hard rights category as a tradable commodity. On the other 
hand, the liberal perspective advocates that code-sharing must be viewed from a purely 
marketing perspective; the airlines themselves arrange code-sharing and there is no 
regulation in bilaterals and no requirement of authorisation. Code-sharing has not 
developed into a tradable commodity as there is no custom (as evidenced by the 
requirements of usus and opinio iuris) supporting code-sharing as a tradable right. The 
reason for this lack of custom is that code-sharing developed purely for reasons of 
expediency. For this reason, De Groot states that the restrictive approaches relating 
to code-sharing do not represent custom and that ' ... [S]uch legal position is utterly at 
odds with established international custom. It would severely compromise the existing 
interairline practice and the traditional frequency regimes observed by all countries of 
92 De Groot (1994) 65. 
93 De Groot (1994) 69-71. 
94 De Groot (1994) 69-71 and Humphreys (1994) 201. 
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the world under existing bilateral agreements.'95 
Although there is merit in this argument, it can also be argued that it was expediency 
which led to the development of the standard (or rather customised provisions) that are 
now part and parcel of bilateral air service agreements. Both soft and hard provisions 
became customised with a development that arose out of need: a need for a flexible 
and operational system. For this reason, it is quite possible that in the continued 
development of the bilateral air service agreement, the result may well be the 
customisation of the code-share provisions. This will naturally depend on the industry 
growth patterns, the attitudes of governments and airlines, and expediency. 
95 De Groot (1994) 72. 
CHAPTER4 
WHERE DO BILATERAL AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS FIT INTO 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM? 
4.1 Introduction 
A bilateral air service agreement is an treaty between two states with the aim of setting 
up an international regime to govern international scheduled flights between two 
countries. The agreement has as its aim the granting of rights to another country 
(broadly speaking, the right to enter and undertake transactions in its airspace which, 
without the agreement, would amount to a violation of its sovereignty). Bilateral air 
service agreements contain all the elements required for a valid treaty as they are 
international agreements concluded between states in written form intended to create 
rights and duties and governed by international law. 96 
4.2 The International Air Services Act (IASA) 60 of 1993 and South African 
Bilateral Air Service Agreements 
In South Africa, the IASA is the umbrella legislation that allows for the negotiation of 
bilateral air service agreements and regulates air services to and from the Republic. 97 
The background objectives against which bilateral agreements are negotiated in South 
Africa are that trade and tourism to and from the Republic are to be promoted, 
competition in international air services is to be promoted, and a high standard of safety 
in international air services is required.98 
96 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 2(a). Article 2(a) goes on to mention 
that the treaties can be embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments. 
This is particularly apt for bilateral air service agreements as follow-up memoranda of 
understanding often change elements in the bilateral relationship. These additional memoranda, 
or instruments, are to also be considered as part and parcel of the treaty relationship. 
97 It should be noted that the air services regulated in the Act include both scheduled and non-
scheduled. 
98 Section 3 of IASA. 
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Section 35 of the IASA states that the Minister may enter into any transport service 
agreement with the government or other appropriate authority of another state or 
territory regarding the control over and regulation of any class of or type of international 
air service. The agreement may include arrangements with regard to, inter alia, the 
following: the designation of persons to operate the service, control over the capacity 
and frequency of the services, the reciprocal exchange of rights, the filing of tariffs, anti-
competitive practices, commercial agreements between the airlines, and the reciprocal 
equal treatment of airlines.99 
4.3 The South African legal system and bilateral air service agreements 
The next question to be considered is what kind of treaties or agreements these 
bilaterals constitute. An answer can be found in the early writings on air service 
relations where the American view of bilateral agreements is that they are executive 
agreements. 100 This is supported by the 1996 SA-USA bilateral air service agreement 
where no provision is made for the constitutional provisions relating to treaties to be 
complied with prior to the agreement's entry into force. The agreement entered into 
force on the date of signature. 
In South Africa, it is trite that treaties need to be incorporated into the law of the country 
before they can be considered as part of the municipal law and so be available to the 
courts. in fact, the locus classicus that sets out this principle is the Pan Am-case which 
happened to involve a bilateral air service agreement. 101 Historically, bilateral air service 
agreements are not incorporated into the municipal law of South Africa and remain 
beyond the scope of court interpretation. 
99 Article 35(2) IASA. 
1 oo Lissitzyn (1950) 32. 
101 Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Co. Ltd SA 1965 
3 151 . See on 161 where it is stated that the 194 7 bilateral agreement between South Africa and 
the United States had not been incorporated. 
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With the constitutional changes that have taken place in South Africa recently, the 
question can be asked as to the status of the executive bilateral air service agreements 
in South African law. In terms of section 231(4) of the 1996 Constitution, Act 108 of 
1996, an international agreement of a technical, administrative, or executive nature, or 
an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by 
the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and Council 
within a reasonable time. As a result of this, bilateral air services agreements will be 
binding on the Republic without Assembly and Council approval, but will have to be 
tabled before the Assembly and Council for information purposes. As a result of this, 
bilateral air service agreements do not have municipal application and disputes arising 
under them will not be adjudicated in the municipal courts. 
4.4 The procedure after the signing of the bilateral agreement 
The IASA also regulates what takes place after the bilateral agreement (if there is one), 
has been negotiated and the airlines designated. The designated South African 
airline(s) applies for a licence to operate the service while the foreign airline applies for 
a foreign operators permit. 102 To obtain the licence, the applicant needs to be fit and 
able to operate the international service. 103 The applicant needs to satisfy the Council 
that as a natural person, he is resident in the Republic. 104 Alternatively, if the applicant 
is not a natural person, that it is incorporated in the Republic and that voting rights in 
respect of that person are substantially held by residents of the Republic. 105 The 
applicant needs to satisfy the Council that it will be actively and effectively in control of 
the international air service and that the aircraft involved in the operation of the 
102 Sections 17 and 25 of IASA respectively. 
103 A prerequisite is that the international service must be operated within the structure of the 
existing international air service system of the Republic. 
104 Section 17(5)(a) of IASA. 
105 Section 17(5)(b) of IASA. 
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international air service will be South African aircraft. 106 
The designated foreign airline obtains a permit if certain conditions are satisfied107. The 
applicant has to comply with the applicable international conventions as implemented 
in South Africa as law;108 must be fit and able to operate the service; 109 must have a valid 
foreign licence from the designating country or the service must fall under a air 
transport agreement. 110 The applicant also has to comply with the prescribed 
requirements as set out in the International Air Service Regulations of 1994.111 These 
regulations set out the general section 25 requirements. However, more mention should 
be made of the services that fall under an air transport agreement. 
It would appear from section 25(2)(c) that a valid foreign licence is not required for a 
foreign operator's permit if the service is operated by virtue of an air transport 
agreement. However, the air transport agreement indicates that the states mutually 
agree on requirements that need to be fulfilled in 9rder to obtain a valid operating 
authorization, such as the permit. 
Section 25(2)( c) must be read together with the air services agreement that governs the 
specific relationship. Air service agreements require that the country designating an 
airline fulfill certain requirements. An example that can be mentioned is that of the 
South Africa - United States air service agreement where Article 3 relating to 
designation states in section 2: 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
On receipt of such a designation, and of applications from the designated airline, in the form and 
manner prescribed for operating authorizations and technical permissions, the other Party shall 
Section 17(5)(c) of IASA. 
Section 25(2) of IASA. 
Section 25(2)(a) of IASA. 
Section 25(2)(b) of IASA. 
Section 25(2)(c) of IASA. 
Section 25(2)(d) of IASA. 
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grant appropriate authorizations and permissions with minimum procedural delay, provided: 
b the designated airline is qualified to meet the conditions prescribed under the laws and 
regulations normally applied to the operation of international air transportation by the 
Party considering the application or applications; and 
c the Party designating the airline is maintaining and administering the standards set forth 
in Article 6 (Safety) .... 
Article 6 goes on to state in section 1 that each party shall recognize as valid, for the 
purpose of operating the air transportation provided for in this Agreement, certificates 
of airworthiness, certificates of competency, and licences issued or validated by the 
other Party and still in force, provided that the requirements for such certificates or 
licences at least equal the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to 
the Convention. 
The air service agreement itself sets the requirements for operating authorizations. 
Therefore, when reading section 25(2)(c) of the IASA together with the air services 
agreement, it is clear that in order to obtain authorization from the partner country, valid 
licences are required. A further reading of section 25 and the air service agreement 
gives the impression that the agreement grants an automatic right to obtain a foreign 
operating permit. This, however, is not the case. Although the provisions in the air 
service agreement state that the parties will grant authorisations, these are subject to 
the maintenance of standards as set out in national legislation. 112 If the standards set 
are not met by the applicant airline, there is no duty to grant the permit. 
112 This national legislation usually incorporates the international standards set out in the 
Convention. 
CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
The main theme of this work has been a discussion of the development of the 
provisions of bilateral air service agreements. It has been shown that bilateral 
provisions have evolved to encompass changes and growth in the industry. The 
essence of the bilateral agreement is the regulation of the air services. The technical, 
administrative and economic regulatory provisions are included here. States are very 
much involved with this process, both as administrators of the technical system and as 
regulators of the economic. 
The states' involvement is thanks to the historical influences. Firstly, the Chicago 
Convention, based on sovereignty and with its protectionist approach, allowed for the 
development of bilateral agreements and promoted the role of states in granting 
reciprocal rights in aviation. Secondly, what also needs to be borne in mind is that, until 
recently, most airlines were wholly state owned and run as part of the state machinery. 
In many countries this situation still exists. Today, the focus has shifted somewhat. 
What was once considered to be an industry requiring measures of state control, is now 
moving towards a more liberal, global approach. The problem is that many states 
remain trapped in protectionist attitudes befitting the early years of aviation. 
Airlines too are involved in the world of bilateral relation.ships. However, today the role 
of the airline is changing as it moves from state-owned airline to private company with 
a very costly business to run. Protectionist state involvement is declining. Airlines are 
involved with the bilateral agreements as the promotors of new and innovative ways of 
accessing and harnessing the potential of designated routes and alliances that come 
their way. 
Within this change in the aviation relations between the state and the airline, the 
question must be asked: does it still make sense for the state to be negotiating the 
parameters within which the airline may operate? 
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A liberal approach would deny states the right to set parameters. However, to 
undermine state involvement would be to undermine the entire Chicago system as it 
exists today- that is both the Chicago Convention and the bilateral regime that arose 
as a result of it which is based on the sovereignty that gives states the right to barter 
aviation rights with other countries. The Chicago system and the bilateral agreements 
cannot simply be wished away. It would also mean an open-market, free-for-all 
approach that could well see the demise of the "national" airline and the possible 
growth of supra-national airlines which could consist of various airlines in alliances or 
cooperative arrangements. 
What then are the possible solutions? I would like to suggest two alternative 
approaches that could well see a clearer definition between the state and the airline. 
The first is the ever present idea of a final multilateral solution to the economic 
regulation of international civil aviation. Long dreamed of, a multilateral regime devoted 
to the economic aspects of the industry has yet to materialise. Too much stands in 
opposition: the protective nature of the state being just one opposing force. However, 
there may well be small developments on other fronts. The GATS agreement allows for 
a small measure of multilateral regulation of certain aspects of the aviation industry. 113 
As the GATS regulates trade in services, it is conceivable that with future negotiations 
in the WTO, air services could well be more fully incorporated into a multilateral system 
that could regulate the economic aspects. 
A second proposal, somewhat more radical, relates directly the arguments that I have 
attempted to make in this work. There have been developments in bilateral air service 
agreements that indicate the growing influence of the airlines in the organising of the 
relationship. I would like to propose that state involvement be lessened in the bilateral 
agreement and that the agreement return to a more "pure" form. Simplify the 
agreement. By focussing on the most important areas of the bilateral, the conditions of 
113 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) which forms part of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
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the services, the states regulate the aspects that directly involve the international 
requirements and are affected by sovereignty - such as designation, authorisation, 
routes, safety and security. This maintains state involvement in the aviation 
relationship. By removing from the bilateral agreement the provisions relating to 
cooperative arrangements, these arrangements are left in the hands of the airline. In 
any event, these working relationships are those proposed by the airlines and they 
should be left to sort them out, organise and implement them. By all means, allow the 
states to determine the capacity available, but then allow the airlines to cooperate in 
any fashion to achieve the workable capacity. The bilateral arrangement should merely 
allow for cooperative arrangements without dictating the nature or kinds of 
arrangement. 
The advantage of such a system is that it would encourage growth in the industry 
without undue state involvement. 
c 
Cheng (1962) 
Congdon (1994) 
D 
De Groot (1994) 
De Leon (1995) 
Delport (1995) 
Dempsey (1987) 
Diamond (1975) 
Diedericks-Verschoor 
(1993) 
F 
Freer (1994) 
39 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Cheng B The law of international air transport. 
Published under the auspices of the London Institute 
of World Affairs. London Steven and Sons Ltd New 
York Oceana Publications Inc. (1962) 
Congdon L "Bilateral Agreements-Who wins?" In 
International Civil Aviation Organisation 50 Years A 
global celebration 1944-1994. Published by 
International Systems and Communications Ltd 
(1994) 
De Groot Jan Ernst C "United State's policies and 
lessons for Europe" 1994 Air and Space Law 62 
De Leon PM "The conduct of a national aviation 
policy in the light of the Chicago Convention" 1995 
Annals of air and space law 245 
Delport R "Amerikaners dring aan op oper 
lugbeleid"1995 Finansies en Tegniek 11 August 23 
Dempsey PS Law and Foreign Policy in International 
Aviation Transnational Publishers Dobbs Ferry 
(1987) 
Diamond BD "The Bermuda Agreement revisited: a 
look at the past, present and future of bilateral air 
transport agreements" 1975 Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 419 
Diedericks-Verschoor IHPh An Introduction to Air . 
Law Kluwer (1993 Fifth revised edition) 
Freer DW "The Chicago Conference of 1944" 
International Civil Organisation 1944-1994 50 Years 
global celebrations International Systems and 
Communications Ltd (1994) 
G 
Gerti er 
Guldimann 
H 
Haanappel 
Humphreys 
L 
Lehner 
Lissitzyn 
Lowenfeld 
M 
Matte 
Manual 
Montag 
(1991) 
(1979) 
(1995) 
(1994) 
(1995) 
(1950) 
(1981) 
(1981) 
(1996) 
(1994) 
40 
Gertler JZ "ICAO and bilateralism: the case of 
standard bilateral clauses" 1991 Annals of Air and 
Space Law57 
Guldimann W "The distinction between scheduled 
and non-scheduled air services" 1971 Annals of Air 
and Space Law 135 
Haanappel P "The transformation of sovereignty in 
the air'' 1995 Air and Space law 311 
Humphreys BK "The implications of international 
code-sharing" 1994 Journal of Air Transport 
Management 195 
Lehner RD "Protectionism, prestige, and national 
security: the alliance against multilateral trade in 
international air transport" 1995 Duke Law Journal 
436 
Lissitzyn OJ "The legal status of executive 
agreements on air transportation" 1950 Journal of 
Air Law and Commerce volume 18 12-32 
Lowenfeld AF Introduction to air law Matthew Bender 
(2nd Ed 1981) 
Mattte NM Treatise on air-aeronautical law 1981 
Institute and Centre of Air and Space law McGill 
University The Carswell Co Ltd Toronto 
International Civil Aviation Organisation Manual on 
the Regulation of International air transport ICAO 
First Edition 1996 Doc 9626 
Montag F "Legal questions arising from code-
sharing" 1994 European Air Law Association Annual 
Conference. Conference papers. 
41 
N 
Naveau (1989) Naveau J International Transport in a Changing 
World Utrecht studies in air and space law. Kluwer 
(1989) 
p 
Prins (1992) Prins V "The new South African Aviation Policy: 
scheduled air services" Department of Transport 
1992 Conference on civil aviation policy in South 
Africa held at Volkswagen Marketing Conference 
Centre Midrand 25 and 26 August Conference 
papers 
s 
Sochor (1989) Sochor E "From the DC-3 to hypersonic flight: ICAO 
in a changing environment"1989 Journal of Air Law 
and Commerce 407 
Stockfish (1992) Stockfish B "Opening closed skies: The prospects 
for further liberalization of trade in international air 
transport services" 1992 Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 599 
w 
Wassenbergh (1995) Wassenbergh HA " 'Legitimate' shares of states 
under international air and space transportation 
regulation" 1995 Annals of Air and Space law 83. 
Wassenbergh (1996) Wassenbergh HA "Deregulation of Competition in 
international air transport" 1996 Air and Space Law 
80 
z 
Zylicz (1992) Zylicz M International air transport Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (1992) 
42 
Cases 
South African Airways v Dole 817 F2d 119 
Decision No 4L1236193 Adm Court Cologne (1 October 1993) unreported as quoted 
by De Groot ( 1994) 69 
Pan American World Airways Incorporated v SA Fire and Accident Insurance Company 
Ltd SA 1965 3 151 
43 
Conventions and Statutes 
Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation 1919 (Paris Convention) 
1922 11 UNTS 173 
Convention on International Civil Aviation Chicago 7 December 1944 15 UNTS 295 
International Air Service Transit Agreement 1944 84 UNTS 38 (1944) 
International Air Transport Agreement 1944 171 UNTS 387 (1944) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 115 UNTS 331 
Chicago Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes, Chicago Convention 
1944, Final Act Section VIII 
Air Services Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1946 (Bermuda I) 3 UNTS 253 
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning Air 
Services (Bermuda II) July 23, 1977 
United States: Model Bilateral Air Transport Agreement (Open skies agreement) March 
20, 1995 ILM 
Agreement between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Government 
of the United States of America relating to air services between their respective 
territories, 1947 
44 
1996 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa regarding scheduled international air 
services. Signed on the 23 July 1996 on which date it also became effective. 
Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft, Tokyo 1963 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, The Hague 1970 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation 
Montreal 1971 
The International Air Services Act (IASA) 60 of 1993 
Civil Aviation offences Act 1 O of 1972 
45 
Other documents 
ICAO document 7278/841 as quoted in Guldimann (1979) 
Fax dated 7 April 1997 (reference CA21/4/2/1) Department of Transport to the 
Directorate of Air Transport Regulation. Subject International Air Service Act 1993 (Act 
60of1993) 
Press release April 09 1997 CDCAA on the British Airways Comair Franchise 
Agreement decision by the International Air Services Council. 
Interview with Mr J Biermann Department of Transport 18 February 1998 
